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1 Introduction
Traditional access control models either permit access or deny it completely.
There is an implicit assumption that all access needs are known in advance
and that the conditions of those needs can be expressed in machine readable
form. However, reality is dynamic and unanticipated situations occur all
the time. Most manual administrative procedures are flexible enough to
allow people to stretch the rules. In contrast, most access control models
for electronic systems do not allow for similar flexibility. A pedantic access
control system can cause frustration, or worse, can prevent people from doing
their job. In [1], for instance, it is suggested that if a secretary cannot forge
the signature of his/her boss in an electronic system, the electronic system
is not going to work. An alternative would be to delegate the required
power to the secretary explicitly, but this is just another form of planning
in advance. Recent works in distributed access control models [2, 3, 4]
suggests mechanisms to allow delegation and grant of authorisations when
they are needed. We might also imagine a solution in the form of a system
for requesting access rights as needed.
However, all these approaches require that some authorisations are cre-
ated in advance. Either the explicit permission or a delegation right that
allows the permission to be created when it is needed. None of these ap-
proaches address the issue that it is not always possible to plan ahead, and
that the authority empowered to create an authorisation may not be avail-
able at the time access is needed and authorisation for it is missing.
What we propose instead is a system that would routinely allow access,
under specified constraints, even in the case when it is not explicitly permit-
ted. Instead the system depends on audit and sanctioning for enforcement.
This mirrors manual organisations. Established organisation theory recog-
nizes such dependency on rule bending, [5].
Of course such procedures are not appropriate in all situations. For
instance, some information has to be secret and trusted only to a select
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group. This is also the case in manual organisations: some rooms are locked
and require special key cards to allow people in. Our proposed model makes
the same distinctions.
We propose to explicitly, in the security policy, distinguish between what
a principal can do, what it is permitted to do, and what it is forbidden to
do. The importance of these distinctions in computer security is argued
in [6]. The intersection of can and not permitted is what we refer to as
possibility-with-override or (sometimes) ability to override.
We also propose the concept of authority resolution which is a process
which automatically finds an access control policy authority who can approve
a specific override.
We believe that by including override and authority resolution in the
access control policy directly, management of overrides can be improved.
1.1 Related Work
The idea of being able to override denied access is not new. Here we mention
just some of the recent work.
Dean Povey, [7, 8], has done work that is similar to ours . Povey rec-
ognizes the problem with legitimate demand for access in unanticipated
situations. His main focus is on guaranteeing system integrity by means of
transactions that can be rolled back. We believe that automatic recovery in
general is not possible and in many cases costly to implement, so we put our
emphasis on audit and manual recovery. However, the issues are orthogonal:
automatic recovery, as Povey demonstrates, may be possible in some cases,
and here it can be used in conjunction with our methods.
Gunnar Stevens and Volker Wolf [9] have performed a case study at a
steel mill. They differentiate between ex-ante, uno-tempore and ex-post ac-
cess control, depending on whether the permission is granted before, during
or after access. Stevens and Wolf noticed that the manual processes used
by the steel mill was a mixture of all three types of access control. This
compelled them to design a computerized access control system that would
allow such a mixture. In relation to their work, this paper deals with ex-post
access control.
Jaeger et. al. [10] introduce a concept called access control spaces. This
concept is used primarily for analyzing conflicts in access control policy or
to analyze whether a set of assigned permissions and constraints on possible
assignments completely cover all possible assignments. The relation to our
work is that access control spaces, which present a partition of permissions
similar to which we present, can be used to eliminate any ‘forgotten’ access
possibilities. However, there is nothing access control spaces can do for
those cases where the desired policy cannot be expressed in the given policy
language. Jaeger et. al. in fact suggest the use of access override and audit
in some cases.
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XACML [11] includes the concept of obligation which can be used for
instance for specifying different access levels and that an access should be
logged.
We have not been able to find any previous work on automatic authority
resolution.
2 Motivation
Existing access control systems implicitly assume that all knowledge about
the access needs of users are known, and defining an access control policy is
‘simply’ a matter of specifying that knowledge in a suitable formal language.
To leave that assumption, we need to think about what kind of knowledge
we have and what we cannot have.
Assume that we are to draft an access control policy for an organisation.
In order to do so, we can study how the organisation is supposed to function,
and define the conditions and subjects of access to specified objects. From
this we can gather a set of access rules, which we can encode in the machine
readable security policy.
However this list of access needs is going to be incomplete. There are two
sources of incompleteness. The first is that not all situations for an access
permission will be expressible in the machine readable language in use; the
second is that there are many needs we simply cannot predict.
This incompleteness in the possibility of drafting a security policy will
present itself as a conflict between confidentiality/integrity on the one hand
and availability on the other. For instance, we want to protect the con-
fidentiality of medical data, but we are also afraid of emergencies where
unanticipated access might be needed.
To solve this conflict, we want to extend our access control model such
that we can leave the decision to access at the discretion of the user. We let
the user have the possibility to override a denial of access, within specific
bounds. The user is better capable of judging the situation in an unantic-
ipated event than the access control system is. We do not place the whole
burden of enforcing the security policy on the access control mechanism
alone. Instead, to combat abuse, we log all uses of such access overrides in a
special way. Note that this is not the same as logging any access for a post
review, as it is usually done.
We note that, while designing an access control policy, we will likely
find situations where we can say with certainty that access should not be
permitted. The access control model should support this so that access
override would not always be possible.
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3 Overrides
We can divide all possible future access scenarios into the following cate-
gories:
1. Anticipated, allowed and machine encodable: Situations for which we
can say ahead of time that access should be allowed and for which
we can express the conditions in machine readable form. Ex. “All
employees can read the company newsletter.”
2. Anticipated, denied and machine encodable: Situations for which we
can say ahead of time that access should be denied and for which
we can express the conditions in machine readable form. Ex. “Non-
medical personnel may not read patient records.”
3. Anticipated, allowed and not machine encodable: Situations for which
we can say ahead of time that access should be permitted but we
cannot express the conditions in machine readable form. Ex. “In case
of an emergency, any doctor may read the patient’s records.” (We
cannot always formally define “an emergency”.)
4. Anticipated, denied and not machine encodable: Situations for which
we can say ahead of time that access should be denied but we cannot
express the conditions in machine readable form.
5. Unanticipated : Situations that we have forgotten to consider or cannot
predict.
When defining the security policy, we need to partition the “situation
space” into these categories, and then map the categories into the security
policy. To support the ambiguous cases, we allow three possible outcomes to
an access request: permitted access, denied access and access possible with
override.
Those situations that we can describe will be easy to include in the
permitted and denied access categories. The situations where we have only
a partial description of the situation are placed in the possible category. How
the forgotten and unanticipated situations are classified depends on how we
describe the security policy. There are three alternatives:
1. Define the permitted accesses and the possible accesses. By default
everything else is denied.
2. Define the permitted accesses and the denied accesses. By default
everything else is possible.
3. Define the denied and possible. By default everything else is permitted.
4
For instance, in the first case we could say that a doctor is permitted
to read only the records of his own patients, so we include a permission for
that only. However, we can imagine that in case of an emergency a doctor
may need to access the records of other patients as well, but there is no
way we can define all emergencies formally and in advance, so we include a
possibility-with-override for doctors to read any patient record. By default
anyone else is denied access and cannot override.
There is a difference between the cases. We cannot describe the scenarios
that we do not know in advance, so they will fall in the default category. The
most sensible default depends on the organisation. In some cases it may be
sensible to protect confidentiality by making denied access the default. In
other cases availability may be more important, so possible-with-override is
the better default. The third case, where everything is permitted by default,
may seem counterintuitive, but might have value in cases where availability
is critical.
Jaeger et. al. [10] suggest a categorization similar to the second type,
where they allow an user to override some denied accesses.
3.1 Access Control Policies
In this paper, we will focus on the first case listed above, that is when the
access control policy defines permitted and possible accesses.
To include override in an access control model we introduce the possibility-
with-override concept, which is analoguos to a permission with two differ-
ences. The first difference is that using a possibility-with-override to gain
access should be different for the user than using a regular permission. Some
kind of warning message should be presented. The other difference is that
uses of possibilities should be logged and thorougly audited.
Most access control policy languages can probably be easily extended to
support both and languages already support more than a yes or no answer
to an request. For instance, in XACML [11] an obligation could be used to
implement both the warning and the logging.
However, in order to assist the audit, we would also like each override
to be automatically reported to an authority of that particular permission.
This leads to authority resolution.
4 Authority Resolution
We call the mechanism by which we from an access control policy can find a
set of authorities for a given permission authority resolution. The permission
does not necessarily have to exist in the policy, in which case we want
to find all principals who would be authorised to create the permission.
Note that we do not assume that all authorisations are created by a single
administrator, but instead we imagine that administration of authorisations
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is decentralised, with different administrators/managers controlling different
parts of the policy.
The authority resolution mechanism can be used in conjunction with
possibilities to assist in the audit of overrides. We (informally) suggest the
following approach:
1. The user tries to access an object.
2. The application uses an access control decision function to check whether
access should be permitted.
3. The access control decision function responds that the user is not per-
mitted to access, but can override that to gain access.
4. The application asks for a confirmation from the user and the user
confirms.
5. The application performs the access.
6. The application uses the authority resolution function to get a set of
authorities whom to report the override to.
7. One or more of the authorities audit the override and do any sanction-
ing ex-post.
To answer the question of who is a legitimate authority we note that an
approval of an override is in effect a retroactive issuing of a permission that
would have permitted the access. Thus the authorities who should be able
to approve an override are precisely those who can create a permission for
the access that was overridden. How to calculate who they are depends on
the access control policy language. We will need a language that contains
meta level authorisations, that is permissions for changing the access control
policy itself. Some examples of such languages are
In some access control policies it is possible that there are multiple legit-
imate authorities for approving a given override. This leads us to ask whom
among these we should notify and in case we notify multiple authorities, in
what order and what happens in case some of them approve and some of
them disapprove.
From an organisational point of view we can notice that most organisa-
tions are more or less decentralised in that there are vertical and horisontal
separations of authority. By horisontal separation we mean that different
managers have different areas of authority. For instance the manager of the
sales department has different authorisations than the manager of the en-
gineering department. By vertical separation we mean that there typically
are different levels of management and higher level management commonly
delegate authority to lower levels of management. Even though high level
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managers in principle have power over low level managers, they may not be
familiar with the details of day to day operations. (On a side note, a supe-
rior person in an organisational hierarchy does not necessarely have all the
authorizations of her subordinates, which somewhat confuses the “vertical”
and “horisontal” analogies.) We therefore find two desirable properties for
the authority resolution algorithm.
4.1 Desirable Properties
We desire the authority resolution and override approval mechanisms to have
• Safeness: Only legitimate authorities should be included.
• Unobtrusiveness: Among the legitimate authorities, we should start
the audit by notifying those who are most likely to understand the
override and least likely to be bothered unnecessarily.
The first property should be easily achieved given an access control model.
For the second property there are more considerations. Mainly we need
to find some order in which the authorities should be notified to minimize
hassle for high level managers. But we also need to consider what we should
do in case several authorities have differences in opinion. Let us look at the
order of notification first.
4.2 Order of notification
First we note that the person who created the possibility-with-override that
made an override possible is a prime candidate to be notified first, as long
as he is a legitimate authority. The rationale is that whoever made the
override possible is best placed to judge whether to approve the override.
Now, depending on the particular access control framework, there may be
additional information available. If the access control framework has some
kind of hierarchy of authorisations, the hierarchy can be used to order the
authorities. One example of such a framework is the calculus of privileges,
[4, 12], in which all authorisations are issued in the form of delegations,
and the delegations form a hierarchy with higher level managers at the top.
Such high level authorities should be notified after lower level authorities.
Another example would be a directory tree in which authorisations can be
inherited along the nodes. Someone authorised for a more specific subtree
should be notified before others, since we as a heuristic may assume that he
is more familiar with the details of that particular subtree.
It should be noted that depending on the access control framework the
ordering of the authorities may not be complete.
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4.3 Conflict resolution
Now, assuming we have some (perhaps incomplete) ordering of the author-
ities, what would we do in case authorities we notify do not take action or
differ in their opinions?
Again, this depends on the particular access control framework. We
would like to mimic the semantics of the particular underlaying framework
in use as much as possible. So since we can view the approval as a retroactive
creation of a permission, we have to ask the question, what would happen
if the authorities would have created different permissions for an access
corresponding to the override? This will depend on the conflict resolution
policy of the framework.
Consider the case in which the access control framework does not have
negative permissions. In case some authorities approve and some disapprove,
the approvals should have precedence, since there would be no way to create
a negative permission in the first place. If all of them disapprove (or do not
care), we view the override as disapproved. This means that the order in
which we notify the authorities is not critical as long as we notify all of them
until someone approves.
In case there are negative permissions in the access control framework,
depending on the conflict resolution algorithm, an authority who also could
issue a negative permission blocking the overridden access, would be able to
disapprove an override and stop it from being sent to higher level authorities.
Thus, how many of all the authorities should be notified depends on the
semantics of the particular access control framework in use.
5 Future work
We have started work on incorporating these ideas in the “calculus of priv-
ileges” access control framework, which supports the management stucture
of authorisations in the form of a hierarchy of delegations. We will present
an algorithm for authority resolution based on that framework and prove
some properties of that algorithm.
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